President Macapagal-Arroyo, of course, was one of the first national leaders around the world to get George Dubya on the phone after those jumbo jets slammed into the Twin Towers, expressing her unconditional support and pledging to use whatever meagre resources the Philippines might have in the fight against global terrorism. She has since been squarely in the Americans' corner, and has benefitted substantially in terms of inflows of foreign and military aid. The AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) brass are basking in the glow of new shipments of helicopters and miscellaneous and sundry armamentaria. The most visible of the aid, however, takes the form of the 650 Yank advisors now down south training Filipino troops as part of "Balikatan," joint training exercises being conducted in the belly of the beast.

Predictably, there has been a bit of a domestic uproar, with opposition being voiced by leftists, Nationalists, NGOs, and elements of the opposition. But Ate Glo may have made a huge blunder at her weekly press con on Friday. Not to put too fine a point on it, she came off sounding like a Filipino version of Dubya at his patriotic, xenophobic best. To be specific, she said that those who opposed the RP-US war games were "not Filipinos," rather they were "Abu Sayyaf lovers." GMA is now being lambasted from all directions, including a nice little shot in his own handwriting issued by Senator Joker Arroyo (he who played such a key role in the denouement of EDSA II): "No President of the Philippines, and we have had 13 of them, had ever dared say that any Filipino who happens to disagree with the President is not a Filipino...Not even Marcos denied any of his opponents their birthright."

Methinks the President's thin skin is wearing even thinner. One of the underlying problems is a rather glaring logical flaw in the Balikitan exercises, which the administration argues are constitutional under the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for short, the agreement that has allowed the Americans to come over here for joint training exercises but not set up bases again). Namely, past exercises have been held up in Pampanga (at the old Clark Air Base, now a Special Economic Zone), Zambales (Subic, ditto an old American base and now ecozone), or other areas in Luzon. And those training exercises were hunky-dory and achieved their purposes.

So Raoul has to ask: How come the Balikatan exercises were shifted not only to the Southern provinces, not only to Mindanao -- but to the very heart of the hostilities? And how come, if you're going to put American GIs on patrol with the Filipino troops, are they shackled with early-Vietnam advisor type restrictions (they can not initiate hostilities, but can only shoot back in self-defense)? Makes one wonder what the hidden agenda is, and what kind of shadowy back rooms deal have been made. Or maybe it's all just a subtle quid pro quo agreement, with both the GMA and Bush administration gambling that the Abus will provoke retaliation and that the presumed overwhelming firepower brought by the new US infusions will lead to a quick collapse of the Abu Sayyaf and the heroic rescue of the American hostages. Could happen that way, but Raoul's sometimes on-the-money crystal ball suggests there are a lot of other less positive (and more likely) outcomes . . .